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COMMUNICATIONS

stantiated viewpoints currently surrounding the issue," the standard
follows the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Larus
4 In that decision the court expressly refused to hold
& Brother v. FCC.the fairness doctrine applicable to certain anti-smoking messages for the
reason that the detrimental effects of cigarette smoking are now clearly
established beyond controversy. Such an application of the fairness doctrine avoids the required presentation of viewpoints totally lacking in
present credibility although once perhaps strongly advocated. The test's
second requirement, that the issue affect "a relatively large number of
people," is designed to justify application of the fairness doctrine with
its accompanying demands upon both licensees and the public.
In short, this analysis is designed to bring only those media commercials raising truly significant public issues within the ambit of the
fairness doctrine. With this goal in mind, the proposed test is believed
to satisfy both the demands of the public interest and the practical
requirement that commercial advertising be sustained as a means of
providing revenue for the broadcast industry. Simultaneously, the test
recognizes the importance of bringing increased certainty to a crucially
significant area of the law.
LACY

H.

REAVES

Constitutional Law-Due Process and Compliance with Processing Requirements for Welfare Applications
Judicial impetus to welfare reform has appeared recently as a potent force in the effort to resolve the complex problems surrounding
welfare administration. The source of these problems is the conflict
between the need to reconcile idealistically conceived welfare programs
with the grass-roots practicalities of welfare administration.' In 1970 the
31447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).

'The inability of the courts to establish workable guidelines in the area of welfare
administration may be attributed to the fact that the protections of procedural due
process have only recently been extended to welfare proceedings. The delay in instituting
these safeguards into the framework of the welfare system can be traced to the attitude

that welfare is synonymous with charity and to the ever present controversy over the

"right-privilege" dichotomy.
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Public Assistance-Due Process Clause Requires an
Evidentiar' Hearing to Precede the Termination of Benefits to Welfare Recipients, 16 VILL. L.
REv. 587, 589-90 (1971).
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Supreme Court assumed a vital position in the resolution of this problem by holding in Goldberg v. Kelly' that procedural due process requires that an evidentiary hearing be held before public-assistance payments to welfare recipients may be discontinued. In the recent case of
Like v. Carter3 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the due
process analysis of Kelly to situations in which state welfare officials
administering federal public-assistance funds4 failed to act upon publicassistance applications within the statutorily required time period of
thirty days.5
The court in Like held that such a delay was a denial of the
applicants' due process rights and paid little heed to the large volume
of welfare applications and the insufficient number of competent

workers in the Missouri Welfare Department.6 Rather, the Eighth Circuit noted that the delay in applications was not a result of any fault of
the applicants and that the Missouri Welfare Department could have
greatly minimized the delays.7 The court indicated that the state excep2397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971). Jurisdiction in Like was based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-(4)
(1970). This issue in itself is an intriguing one but one with which the Eighth Circuit had little
difficulty. The court relied on Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (1971), for the proposition "that
where colorable constitutional (equal protection and due process) claims have been raised, jurisdiction will lie." 448 F.2d at 801. Similarly, the court rejected defendants' assertions that jurisdiction
was lacking "by reason of plaintiffs' failure to exhaust available state administrative remedies."
Id. Nor were the defendants persuasive in their contention that jurisdiction was barred under the
eleventh amendment. Id. at 802.
'The State of Missouri cooperates in the following federal programs under the United States
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970): Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301306 (1970): Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970). Aid
to the Blind (AB), 42 U.S.C. § 1201-1206 (1970): Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD), 42 U.S.C.
1351-1355 (1970); and Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled (AABD), 42
U.S.C. 0 1381-1385 (1970). 448 F.2d at 800.
5The applicable federal provision is found in HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANcE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 2200(b)(3) (1970), which provides:
A state plan for OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD must provide that:
(b)(3) prompt action will be taken on each application, within reasonable stateestablished time standards (which, effective July 1, 1968, will not exceed 30 days in
AFDC, OAA, and AB ....
The pertinent Missouri provision is found in Missouri Division of Welfare Regulation No.
4.1 (1968):
For the OAA, ADC, and AB assistance applications (unless there are unusual or extreme circumstances), prompt disposition means that there shall not be more than 30
days between date of application and (a) the date of approval if eligible; or (b) date of
rejection, if ineligible.
6448 F.2d at 803.
Uid. at 804.
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tion that excused compliance with the thirty-day requirement in the case
of unusual or extreme circumstances was inconsistent with the federal
statute and therefore contravened the supremacy clause." In awarding
the decision to the plaintiff-applicants, the court was satisfied
that the plaintiffs as a minimum are entitled to a declaratory judgment
determining that the applications. . . must be acted upon and the first
payment made to eligible applicants within thirty days . . . and that
eligible applicants whose claims have not been passed upon within
thirty days are entitled to have retroactive benefits. . . .
The focal points of this analysis will be the impact of this decision
upon state welfare administration and the applicability of the Kelly
balancing test of due process.
The due process implications of state-caused delay in the processing of welfare applications were not unforeseen by the judiciary. Justice
Black, writing in dissent in Kelly, contended that
the inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed burden[the
right to a pretermination hearing] will be that the government will not
put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an exhaustive
investigation to determine his eligibility. While this Court will perhaps
have insured that no needy person will be taken off the rolls without a
full "due process" proceeding, it will also have insured that many will
never get on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during
the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility.' 0
The court in Like v. Carter,therefore, was readily able to anticipate the
due process problem and to apply appropriately the Kelly solution. Yet,
in its haste to find a denial of due process, the Eighth Circuit glossed
over the requisite balancing of governmental interests against the rights
of the individual welfare recipient and made only conclusory application
of the Kelly test of due process." That Kelly and Like both involved
'ld. at 803. An obvious prerequsite to invocation of the supremacy clause is that there be, in
fact, a federal law that will override the state law in question. That the supremacy clause applied
in Like was established by the judicial acknowledgement that the HEW HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION(1970) has the force and effect of law and therefore that the regulations and exceptions promulgated therein must prevail over contrary state provisions. Id. at 80304.
'Id. at 805.
1397 U.S. at 279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 284-85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"For the application of this test in Kelly, see 397 U.S. at 261-66. Upon implementation of
the balancing test,
the Court prefers to look closely at the particular benefit at stake, weighing factors such
as the nature of government function involved, the extent of the possible injury, the
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rights under a state-administered public-assistance program did not
obviate the need for the Eighth Circuit to implement the Kelly balancing
test. It was essential to ascertain what in fact were the interests of both
government and welfare applicant and whether the applicant's interest
in receiving payments outweighed the government's interest in delay.
Such a balancing test is required in every instance of alleged denial of
due process as one must recognize from the fact that every violation of
a state welfare regulation does not automatically constitute an abridgement of due process. 2 Nor is the scope of Kelly so broad that one may
equate without scrutiny the rights of welfare recipients who have realized financial assistance with those of welfare applicants who have yet
to benefit from a public-assistance program. Therefore, the court in
Like should have considered the following factors: the nature of the
governmental function, the rationale for a particular procedure or regulation, the extent of potential 3injury, and the available methods of adhering to current procedures.'
The fundamental nature of the governmental function of financially
assisting the nation's impoverished was best described by Justice
Brennan in Kelly:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have
come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our
traditions, has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the
same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards
against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of
unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not
mere charity, but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.""
The tenor of the Constitution, if not its letter, thus appears to mandate
reason for the particular procedure, and the available alternatives before determining
the applicability of the due process clause.
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term. 84 HARV. L. REV. 32, 103 (1970).
'2The dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Kelly illustrates this point by questioning whether a
welfare recipient must be accorded a hearing when his public assistance is merely reduced and not
completely terminated. 397 U.S. at 284-85.
"See note I I supra.
"397 U.S. at 264-65, quoting U.S. CONST. Preamble.
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the role that the government must play in public assistance. 15 However,
the absence of a specific constitutional obligation on the federal or state

governments to provide funds for welfare does not remove the right to
survive from that category of rights that are denominated "fundamen-

tal."

6

The thirty-day maximum limitation on the application processing

period is not an irrational guideline for the administration of welfare
funds. Rather, it is a necessary corollary to the governmental recognition of the individual's right to survive and of the prominent position
that government must assume in the protection of that right. 7 However,
the thirty-day requirement in itself was not the central issue in Like,1

since the state regulation conformed to the federal standard except for
a clause in the state provision that read "unless there are unusual or

extreme circumstances."' 9 On the basis of a broad interpretation of this
clause, the defendants in Like contended "that the large volume of

applications and the inability of the state welfare department to employ
a sufficient number of competent case workers excuses compliance with

the thirty-day requirement."20 The rationality of such an interpretation

is highly doubtful. To excuse delay where the applicant was not at fault
or where there was no uncontrollable administrative or emergency delay

(the recognized exceptions under the federal act 2l ) would nullify the
provisions of both the state and federal statute requiring reasonable
"SThe Court relied in Kelly upon the language of the preamble to the Constitution for positive
proof of some "fundamental" quality to the administration of public assistance. 397 U.S. at 265.
The courts have clearly established that there is no constitutional obligation on the states or the
federal government to furnish welfare funds. Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D. Me.
1969): Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 40 (M.D. Ala. 1967), affd on nonconstitutionalgrounds,
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
"E.g.. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), established the essential and
fundamental nature of the right to primary and secondary education without any allusion to
constitutionally imposed obligations.
17448 F.2d at 803, 804.
1"Id. at 803.
"Missouri Division of Welfare Regulation No. 4.1 (1968).
"0448 F.2d at 803.
21
HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AsSISTANcE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 2300(b)(6) (1970)
provides:
Agency policies on standards of promptness for acting on applications are not used as
a basis for denying applications; they are exceeded in practice only in unusual situations
(e.g.. where the agency cannot reach a decision because of failure or delay on the part
of the applicant or an examining physician to provide needed information) and in a small
percentage of cases, and in such instances, the case record clearly shows that the delay
results either from circumstances within the claimant's control or from some administrative or other emergency that could not reasonably be controlled by the agency.
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promptness in application processing.22
The potential for injury caused by processing delay is strikingly
apparent. The withholding of aid beyond the thirty-day period for determining the applicant's eligibility "may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. ' 23 Furthermore, the failure to alleviate promptly an applicant's need for subsistence commodities may engender indignation, frustration, and resentment.24 These natural reactions to a government irresponsive to the
needs of the impoverished may deepen social alienation of large groups
of deprived citizens-an evil that is certainly more fatal to the social
fabric than the travail of a particular welfare petitioner whose application has been unreasonably delayed in processing.
Finally, the reasonable methods of meeting the state and federal
mandate of thirty days must be considered. If there are none, then
perhaps the original requirement was ill-conceived and the proper remedy is not to find a denial of due process but rather to revamp the
guidelines to welfare administration. The court in Like, however, did
conclude that several alternatives to prolonged delay in processing did
exist. Specifically noted was the possibility that "more aggressive and
effective action could be taken in the investigative procedure. ' 2 ' Further
cited was the excessive "twelve-day processing period after certification
elapses before the issuance of a check. ' 2 Also ill-received was the State
Welfare Department's assertion that a prolonged processing period was
required to screen out applications that were allowed on the basis of the
false representations of the applicant. The court indicated that the proper remedies were the invocation of termination proceedings and the
in
implementation of criminal penalties rather than the wholesale delay
27
non-fraudulent.
substantially
were
that
applications
of
processing
The conclusion to be reached under the foregoing application of the
factors involved in the balancing test of Kelly is that due process was
indeed denied the welfare applicants in Like. The governmental function
involved was that of dispensing aid necessary for the subsistence of the
impoverished. The governmental duty of promptly administering such
1448 F.2d at 804.
7'Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
21
1d. at 265.
25448 F.2d at 804.
161d.
2Id.
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relief and the individual right to secure welfare benefits are organically
attached to that body of principles that control our society. The state
interpretation of acceptable exemptions from the explicit thirty-day processing requirement was clearly illogical in view of the general policy
of prompt administration of welfare to those who require it. Furthermore, the potential damage that results from protracted periods of
processing is acute at both the individual and societal level. And finally,
the State Welfare Department did not pursue the available alternatives
to relieve the hardships incurred by excessive delays. The result of
weighing these factors is that the scales of due process come down
heavily on the side of the individual's interests and compel proper state
action to remedy the aggravated conditions present in Like.
The significance of Like v. Carter for welfare administration is
demonstrated in the Eighth Circuit's recognition of the demise of the
"right-privilege" dichotomy and the vitality of the "new property" concept. 2 Like clearly represents the trend away from the "benevolentgratuity argument as a basis for insulating agency action from due
process requirements. 2 9 This traditional view precludes protection of
the due process clause when a privilege rather than a right is involved. 0
This concept has been substantially eroded by two distinct theories. One
theory suggests that despite the characterization of welfare as a privilege, it must nonetheless be accorded due process protection." The
other theory, which has become the prevalent one, regards welfare as a
right.12 This latter theory rests on the premise that "[s]uch benefits are
a matter of statutory entitlement. . . . -3 Judicial recognition of this
premise is effectively
an acceptance of Professor Reich's concept of
"new property," 3 which the Kelly Court acknowledged by noting that
"[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
2'SWee
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965): Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
-JRecent Developments, 16 VILL. L. REV., supra note 1, at 592.
aIThe traditional view was espoused in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in which
the Supreme Court held that insurance benefits under the Social Security Act were not "accrued
property rights." Id. at 610. See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Hamilton
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
"E.g.. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
a2E.g.. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D.
III. 1969).
aGoldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
"1Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country
takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law
concepts of property. ' 35 That the classical "right-privilege" dichotomy
is extinct and that the "entitlement" theory of Reich's "new property"
enjoys complete judicial acquiescence is conclusively established by the
Eighth Circuit's total unconcern in Like over the applicability of due
process protection to the traditional notion of "accrued property
rights. ' 3
The remedies fashioned by the Eighth Circuit in Like will have
significance not only for the aggrieved applicants but also for the entire
concept of state administration of welfare funds. Kelly and Like
establish that the state is no longer a distinct, separate governmental
entity that exercises its reasonable discretion in the administration of
federal public assistance. The two cases demonstrate that the imposition
of federal guidelines, through the power of the supremacy clause, upon
the state administration of welfare funding has resulted in the atrophy
of state discretionary powers in the area of public assistance. The state
has become a mere appendage of the federal government in the management of welfare funds. Yet the alternative to state acquiescence in a
welfare program funded by the federal government is greatly diminished
revenue sources for public-assistance funding, which would be potentially more devastating to a state than the mere curtailment of its discretion. On the other hand, the question remains unresolved as to whether
a state government, having once accepted federal funds, has made an
irrevocable election to accept federal assistance in the future even if
faced with burdensome capital outlays to revamp the entire welfare
program in order to conform to federal provisions.
The judicial response to the foregoing question is problematical
although not altogether unpredictable. The courts appear to be concerned with the practical effects that a controverted state action-such
as the rejection of federal welfare funds-might have on the well-being
of the individual.3 1 Indeed such an emphasis is but a manifestation of
the due process balancing test of Kelly, weighing governmental interests
against those of the ijdividual. The specific interests to be balanced are
the state's concern in maintaining a reasonable degree of discretion over
welfare administration and the individual's ability to survive on a sub1397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
:"Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
:"E.g.. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
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stantially diminished allocation of total welfare funds. It is difficult to
envision that a federal court, having recognized the fundamental duty
of the government to "provide for the general welfare," would permit
the state concern over preservation of its dignity, identity, and discretion
to prevail over the individual's natural need to subsist where the state
has no source of necessary revenue other than federal funds. But perhaps
such a difficulty is not shared by all. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in
Kelly, indicated his doubts over the broad applicability of the due process concept as developed in that case:
Does the Court's holding embrace welfare reductions or denial of
increases as opposed to terminations, or decisions concerning initial
applications or requests for special assistance? The Court supplies no
distinguishable considerations and leaves these crucial questions unanswered. 8
The Court in Kelly did supply identifiable standards for resolving
this issue in the four factors that comprise the majority's due process
balancing test. One of the crucial questions alluded to by Chief Justice
Burger has now been answered by Like. The Court in Like applied the
Kelly balancing test, though not in a conspicuous fashion, and determined that the petitioning applicants were denied due process by state
noncompliance with the thirty-day requirement. In the wake of Like it
is neither illogical nor unforeseeable to predict that the courts' next step
may entail an application of the Kelly due process balancing test to the
situation in which the state has reduced welfare payments by voluntary
non-participation in federal programs. The outcome of such a case
would depend on too many variables-degree of reduction, potential
economic impact, and availability of alternatives-to hazard a general
prediction as to whether the individual's interests will prevail as they did
in Kelly and Like. Although the eventual position that the courts will
assume when faced with this situation is not altogether apparent, the
path that they will tread to reach that conclusion is clear. For the
standard of due process adopted in Kelly, and extended in Like, is not
a panacea for all the ills that beset welfare administration but a guideline to the priorities and interests that must be recognized if welfare is
ever to function in a manner responsive to the needs of those individuals
whose very existence depends on it.
MICHAEL CHARLES EBERHARDT

-397 U.S. at 284-85.

